Martin-L of's theory of types, expounded in 5, 6] and discussed at greater length in 8, 1 4 ] is a theory of types and functions or alternatively of propositions and proofs which has attracted much recent i n terest in the computing science community. There seems to have emerged a consensus that the system provides a good foundation for integrated program development and proof, but that for the system to be usable in practical projects a number of additions need to be made to it. Pre-eminent among these is the proposal to add a subset construction to the system, so that members of the type f x:A j B g are those members of A with the property B. T h i s i s i n c o n trast to the representation of such a t ype by (9x:A) : B whose members consist of pairs (a p) w i t h a : A and p : B a=x] a proof of or witness to the fact that the property B is true of a. This latter representation is faithful to the principle of complete presentation which requires that it should be evident from any object that it has the type asserted of it. The witness is a proof of this fact.
Introduction
Martin-L of's theory of types, expounded in 5, 6] and discussed at greater length in 8, 1 4 ] is a theory of types and functions or alternatively of propositions and proofs which has attracted much recent i n terest in the computing science community. There seems to have emerged a consensus that the system provides a good foundation for integrated program development and proof, but that for the system to be usable in practical projects a number of additions need to be made to it. Pre-eminent among these is the proposal to add a subset construction to the system, so that members of the type f x:A j B g are those members of A with the property B. T h i s i s i n c o n trast to the representation of such a t ype by (9x:A) : B whose members consist of pairs (a p) w i t h a : A and p : B a=x] a proof of or witness to the fact that the property B is true of a. This latter representation is faithful to the principle of complete presentation which requires that it should be evident from any object that it has the type asserted of it. The witness is a proof of this fact.
In this paper after presenting an overview of the two important subset constructions we examine the reasons given for the addition of the subset type and argue that we c a n a c hieve the desired results without complicating the system by such an augmentation.
The rst reason for adding a subset ty p e i s t h a t i t a l l o ws for the separation of the computational information in an object from the proof theoretic information it might contain { this we examine in sections 3 and 4 where we argue that this separation is better achieved by naming the appropriate portions of an object, using the axiom of choice where necessary to identify these portions.
Note that we t a k e the axiom of choice as valid { this is the case for all Martin-L of's systems, and is a simple consequence of the strong elimination rule for the existential quanti er, which allows the second projection from a pair to have dependent t ype. We should also observe that for most constructivists the axiom of choice is unexceptionable { given the interpretation of the quanti ers, a c hoice function can be read o in the obvious way.
The other reason advanced for the subset ty p e i s t h a t i t c a n c o n tribute to the e ciency of evaluation, since by suppressing the proof-theoretic portion of an expression, any e v aluation in this portion will no longer be necessary. W e argue in section 5 that exactly the same e ect is achieved if we u s e lazy evaluation to implement the system.
It is therefore evident t h a t w e can achieve the e ects required without adding to and therefore complicating the system of type theory, as expounded in Martin-L of's original papers, as long as we are prepared to work in a lazy implementation of the theory. Lazy implementations used to have the reputation of being slow, but recent w ork (see, for example, 10]) has shown that this need not be the case.
Type theory
In this section we provide a short review of those aspects of constructive t ype theory relevant to the discussion which follows.
The basic intuition underlying the system of type theory is that to prove is to construct. In particular, { a proof of A^B is a pair of proofs of A and B { a proof of A ) B is a transformation of proofs of A into proofs of B { a proof of A _ B is either a proof of A or a proof of B { a proof of (8x:A) : B (x) t a k es a in A to a proof of B(a), and { a proof of (9x:A) : B (x) is a witness a in A together with a proof of B(a).
This intuitive presentation can be formalised in a collection of deduction rules which m e n tion the judgement a:A which is thought of as expressing a is a proof of the formula A Four rules are presented for each connective. A formation rule describes how the formula is formed, it is a rule of syntax in other words Formation Rule forÂ is a formula B is a formula (A^B) is a formula (^F)
A second rule gives circumstances under which a proof of the formula can be f o u n d { t h i s i s t h e introduction rule. In the case of conjunction, a proof can be formed from proofs of the component formulas.
Introduction Rule for^p
:A q :B (p q):( A^B) (^I) The elimination rule or rules embody the fact that proofs can only be constructed according to the introduction rule(s): any proof of a conjunction can be decomposed to yield proofs of the individual components. Elimination Rules forr :( A^B) fst r:A (^E 1 ) r:( A^B) snd r :B (^E 2 ) Moreover, if we form a proof (a b) o f A^B from proofs of A and B and extract the proofs of A and B from (a b) using (^E) w e derive the proofs we s t a r t e d with { this is described by t h e computation rules.
Computation Rules forf st (p q) ! p snd (p q) ! q
It is striking that these rules can also be thought o f a s r u l e s f o r a t yped functional programming language, if we replace`: : : is a formula' b ỳ : : :i sat y p e '. The rules for the conjunction are those for the product type.
In a similar way, implication can be thought of as forming the function space, disjunction a sum type and the absurd proposition an empty type. Rules for the function type are given in Figure 1 . The connective ) is introduced by means of a -abstraction: the assumption of the object x of A is discharged in the process of forming ( x : A) : e , as the variable x has become bound. The discharge is indicated by the surrounding brackets : : : ]. The formal system of type theory contains as well as the propositional connectives we h a ve discussed, both basic types such as the natural numbers and lists and the quanti ers { w e turn to these now. Further details of the full rules for systems of type theory can be found in 14] and elsewhere.
The universal quanti er can be thought of as de ning a generalised function space in which t h e t ype of the result of a function depends upon the value of the argument(s).
Formation Rule for 8
A i s a f o r m u l a x:A] . . . P is a formula (8x:A) : P is a formula (8F) The dependence can be seen here from the fact that P can contain the variable x free, and so depend upon a value of type A. The universal quanti er is introduced by a -abstraction, where it is assumed that x occurs free in no other assumption than x:A. Computation Rules for 9
Fst (p q) ! p Snd(p q) ! q The existential quanti er can be thought o f a s a t ype constructor in a number of di erent w ays. It forms an in nitary sum of the types B(a) a s a varies over the tag type A it can be thought of as forming modules, when the type A is a universe, and most importantly here, it forms a subset of A, consisting of those elements of A with the property B. I n k eeping with a constructivist approach, the element a carries with it the proof that it belongs to the subset { otherwise how can it be said to reside there?
The elimination rule (9E 0 2 ) i s u n usual in that its conclusion contains the proof object p on the right-hand side of a judgement this is in contrast to the other rules of the system. These other rules reduce to the rules of rst-order intuitionistic predicate calculus if the proof objects are omitted this cannot be done with (9E 0 2 ) since the proof object appears in the formula part of the judgement. The rules presented are equivalent t o t h e strong elimination rule: How should a set be eliminated? If we k n o w that a:fx:A j B g then we certainly know that a : A, but also that B a=x]. What we don't have is a speci c proof that B a=x], so how could we encapsulate this? We can modify the existential elimination rule (9E) so that the hypothetical judgement c : C is derived assuming some y:B a=x], but that c and C cannot depend upon this y. W e use the fact that B a=x] i s p r o vable, but we cannot depend on the proof y itself:
where y is not free in c or C. Since no new operator is added by the elimination rule, there is no computation rule for the subset type. We should note that this makes these rules di erent from others in type theory. T h i s i s a l s o e v i d e n t from the fact that they fail to satisfy the inversion principle of 12] 11] shows that these rules are weaker than might at rst be thought, especially if we a d o p t a n intensional version of type theory. In fact, we cannot in a consistent manner derive the formula (8x:f z:A j P(z) g) : P (x) (1) for most formulas P. This has the consequence that we cannot derive functions to take the head and tail of a non-empty list, if we c hoose to represent the type of non-empty lists by a subset type, f l: A] j nonempty l g where the predicate nonempty is de ned by a recursion over a universe thus: nonempty ] df ? nonempty (a :: x) df > The situation in the extensional theory is better, but there are still cases of the formula (1) which are not derivable consistently. Because of these weaknesses, Martin-L of proposed a new subset theory which incorporates the judgement P i s t r u e into the system.
If the representation of the judgement is to be an improvement o n T T , a s f a r as subsets are concerned, it is desirable that the system validates the rule a : f x:A j P g P (a) is true
This can be done if we m o ve to a system in which propositions and types are distinct. In 8] can be found the subset theory in which the new judgements P p r o pand P i s t r u e are added to the system, together with a set of logical connectives, distinct from the type forming operations introduced in their extensional version of type theory. This system does allow the derivation of (2) but at the cost of losing the isomorphism between propositions and types and making the system more complex.
3 What is a speci cation?
The judgement a : A can be thought of as expressing`a proves the proposition A' a n d a is an object of type A', but it has also been proposed, in 6, 9] for example, that it be read as saying a is a program which meets the speci cation A (y)
It is misleading to apply this interpretation to every judgement a : A. T ake for instance the case of a function f which sorts lists this has type A] ) A], and so, f : A] ) A] Should we therefore say that it meets the speci cation A] ) A]? It does, but then so do the identity and the reverse functions! The type of a function is but one aspect of its speci cation, which should describe the relation between its input and output. This characterisation takes the form
The result (f l ) is ordered and a permutation of the list l for which w e will write S(f). To assert that the speci cation can be met by some implementation, we write
What form do objects of this type take? They are pairs (f p) with f : A] ) A] and p a proof that f has the property S(f). The confusion in (y) i s t h us that the object a consists not of a program meeting the speci cation, but of such a program together with a proof that it meets that speci cation.
In the light of the discussion above, it seems sensible to suggest that we conceive of speci cations as statements (9o:T) : P , and that the formal assertion In developing a proof of the formula (9o:T) : Pwe construct a pair consisting of an object of type T and a proof that the object has the property P . S u c h a pair keeps separate the computational and logical aspects of the development, so that we can extract directly the computational part simply by c hoosing the rst element of the pair. There is a variation on this theme, mentioned in 8] for instance, which suggests that a speci cation of a function should be of the form 
Elements of this type are functions F so that for all x:A, and each of these values will be a pair (y x p x ) w i t h y x :B and p x :P(x y) The pair consists of value and proof information, showing that under this approach the program and its veri cation are inextricably mixed. It has been argued that the only way t o a c hieve this separation is to replace the inner existential type with a subset type, which r e m o ves the proof information p x . This can be done, but the intermingling can be avoided without augmenting the system { w e s i m p l y h a ve t o g i v e t h e i n tended function a name. That such a naming can be achieved in general is a simple consequence of the axiom of choice, w h i c h states that (8x:A) : (9y:B) : P (x y) ) (9f :A ) B) : (8x:A) : P (x f x) Applying modus ponens to this and (3) we deduce the speci cation (9f :A ) B) : (8x:A) : P (x f x) (4) Note that the converse implication to that of the axiom of choice is easily derivable, making the two forms of the speci cation logically equivalent.
It is worth noting that some functions are not speci ed simply by their input/output relation, one example being a hashing function 1 
. This means that speci cations will necessarily have t h e ( 9o :T) : Pform in general.
This analysis of speci cations makes it clear that when we seek a program to meet a speci cation, we look for the rst component o f a m e m ber of an existential type the second proves that the program meets the constraint p a r t of the speci cation. As long as we realise this, it seems irrelevant whether or not our system includes a type of rst components, which is what the subset type consists of. There are other arguments for the introduction of a subset type, which w e turn to now.
Subsets in speci cations
We h a ve seen that the intermingling of computation and veri cation which appears to result from an interpretation of speci cations as propositions can be avoided by the expedient of using the axiom of choice in the obvious way.
In this section we look at other uses of the subset type within speci cations and show that in many o f t h e s e w e can again avoid the subset type by separating from a complex speci cation exactly the part which is computationally relevant in some sense. This is to be done by naming in an appropriate manner the operations and objects sought, as we did in the previous section when we c hanged the 89 speci cation into an 98 form. This reversal of quanti ers which a r i s e s b y naming the function is known to logicians as Skolemizing the quanti ers. We believe the alternative is superior for two reasons: { it is a solution which requires no addition to the system of type theory, a n d { it allows for more delicate distinctions between proof and computation.
The method of Skolemizing can be used in more complex situations, as we n o w see.
Take as an example a simpli cation of the speci cation of the Dutch (or Polish) national ag problem as given in 8]. We n o w s h o w h o w i t m a y be written without the subset type. The original speci cation has the form (8x:A) : f y :f y 0 :B j C(y 0 ) g j P (x y) g with the intention that for each a we n d b in the subset f y 0 : B j C(y 0 ) g of B with the property P(a b). If we replace the subsets by existential types, we h a ve ^P(x (f x )) ) which is inhabited by functions together with proofs of their correctness. I t c a n be argued that this expresses in a clear way w h a t w as rather more implicit in the speci cation based on sets { the formation of an existential type bundles together data and proof, the transformation to (5) makes explicit the unbundling process.
As a second example, consider a problem in which w e are asked to produce for each a in A with the property D(a) s o m e b with the property P (a b). There is an important question of whether the b depends just upon the a, or upon both the a and the proof that it has the property D(a). In the latter case we could write the speci cation thus: If we d o not wish the object sought to depend upon the proof of the property D, w e can write the following speci cation:
(9f :A ) B) : (8x 0 :A) : (8p:D(x 0 )) : P ((x 0 p ) (f x 0 )) (6) in which it is plain that the object (f x 0 ) i n B is not dependent on the proof object p:D(x 0 ). Observe that there is still dependence of the property P on the proof p i f w e w ere to use a subset type to express the speci cation, thus, we would have something of the form (8x 0 :f x 0 :A j D(x 0 ) g) : (9y :B) : P 0 (x 0 y ) where the property P 0 (x y) relates x 0 : A and y : B. This is equivalent t o t h e speci cation (9f :A ) B) : (8x 0 :A) : (8p:D(x 0 )) : P 0 (x 0 (f x 0 )) in which the property P 0 must not mention the proof object p, so that with our more explicit approach w e h a ve been able to express the speci cation (6) which cannot be expressed under the na ve subset discipline.
Computational Irrelevance Lazy Evaluation
The natural de nition of the`head' function on lists is over the type of nonempty lists, given thus:
(nelist A) df (9l: A]) : (nonempty l) where the predicate nonempty was de ned above. The head function itself, hd, is given by hd : (nelist A) ) A hd ( ] p ) df abort A p hd ((a :: x) p ) df a which is formalised in type theory by a primitive recursion over the list component of the pair.
Given an application hd ((2 :: : : : ) : : : ) computation of the result to 2 can proceed in the absence of any information about the elided portions. In particular, the proof information is not necessary for the process of computation to proceed in such a case. Nonetheless, the proof information is crucial in showing that the application is properly typed we cannot apply the function to a bare list, as that list might b e e m p t y. There is thus a tension between what are usually thought o f a s t h e dynamic and static parts of the language. In particular it has been argued that if no separation is achieved, then the e ciency of programs will be impaired by t h e w elter of irrelevant information which they carry around { see section 3.4 of 2] and section 10.3 of 3].
Any conclusion about the e ciency of an object or program is predicated on the evaluation mechanism for the system under consideration, and we n o w argue that a lazy or outermost rst strategy has the advantage of not evaluating the computationally irrelevant.
If we w ork in an intensional system of type theory, then using the results of 5] the system is both strongly normalising and has the Church Rosser property. This means that every sequence of reductions will lead us to the same result. Similar results are valid if we e v aluate to weak head normal form in the extensional case.
We can therefore choose how expressions are to be evaluated. There are two o b vious choices. Strict evaluation is the norm for imperative languages and many functional languages (Standard ML, 4], is an example). Under this discipline, in an application like f a 1 : : :a n the arguments a i are evaluated fully before the whole expression is evaluated. In such a situation, if an argument a k is computationally irrelevant, then its evaluation will degrade the e ciency of the program. The alternative, of normal order evaluation is to begin evaluation of the whole expression, prior to argument e v aluation: if the value of an argument is unnecessary, t h e n i t i s n o t evaluated.
To be formal about the de nition, we s a y t h a t e v aluation in which w e a l w ays choose the leftmost outermost redex is normal order evaluation. If in addition we ensure that no redex is evaluated more than once we call the evaluation lazy.
(For more details on evaluation strategies for functional languages, see 10], for example). In a language with structured data such as pairs and lists, there is a further clause to the de nition: when an argument i s e v aluated it need not be evaluated to normal form it is only evaluated to the extent that is necessary for computation to proceed. This will usually imply that it is evaluated to weak head normal form (see 10]). This means that, for example, an argument of the product type A^B will be reduced to a pair (a b), with the sub-expressions a and b as yet unevaluated. These may o r m a y n o t b e e v aluated in subsequent computation.
Under lazy evaluation computationally irrelevant objects or components of structured objects will simply be ignored, and so no additional computational overhead is imposed. Indeed, it can be argued that the proper de nition of computational relevance would be that which c hose just that portion of an expression which is used in calculating a result under a lazy evaluation discipline.
Another example is given by the following example of the quicksort function over lists. Quicksort is de ned by qsort l df qsort 0 l (#l) p where p is the canonical proof that (#l) (#l). The auxiliary function is given by qsort 0 : ( 8n :N) : (8l: N]) : ((#l n) ) N]) qsort 0 n ] p df ] qsort 0 0 ( a :: x) p df abort N] p 0 qsort 0 (n + 1 ) ( a :: x) p df qsort 0 n (filter (lesseq a) x) p 1 ++ a] + + qsort 0 n (filter (greater a) x) p 2 The function has three parameters: a list (l), a natural number (n), and a proof that the length of l is less that or equal to n. In the second clause of the denition we use the proof p to construct a proof p 0 that 0 is smaller than itself, a contradiction. In the recursive calls to the function, we construct proofs p 1 and p 2 which witness the facts that (filter (lesseq a) x) a n d ( filter (greater a) x) have length at most n if x has.
We h a ve built an implementation of a system of type theory without universes by means of a translation of it into Miranda which is implemented in a lazy fashion. The quicksort function above will sort a list without calculating any of the terms p i in any of the invocations of the function { proof of their computational irrelevance.
There is one drawback to the lazy implementation { no irrelevant terms are evaluated, but there are cases in which tuples are formed and destroyed, as were the tuples in the quicksort example. It seems too high a price to pay for the programmer to have to include for her-or himself an indication of how a program may be optimised, especially as this kind of use analysis can be performed most e ectively by the techniques of abstract interpretation, as discussed in 1] for instance. Linked to this is the syntactic characterisation of computational relevance, which i n volves an examination of the di erent forms that types (i.e. propositions) can take { to be found in section 3.4 of 2]. It is not hard to see that under lazy evaluation the objects deemed to be irrelevant will not contribute to the nal result, and will remain unevaluated.
Conclusion
To summarise, there are two responses to the use of subsets in type theory. Their use in separating the computational from the proof theoretic can be achieved using the appropriate names for functions whose existence is assured by t h e validity of the axiom of choice in type theory.
If proof theoretic information remains in an expression, we c o n tend that if it is indeed irrelevant to the computational behaviour of a function, it will not be evaluated under a lazy evaluation strategy, and so we advocate this as an implementation technique which a voids the unnecessary evaluation which is a consequence of a strict evaluation scheme. As we m e n tioned earlier, there will be some cases in which structures are formed needlessly { we see their elimination as the role of the implementation of the system, and would view abstract interpretation as an ideal tool for this purpose.
Using the subset type to represent a subset brings problems as we s a w i n the previous section, it is not possible in general to recover the witnessing in-formation from a subset type, especially in an intensional system like T T , a n d so in these cases, the existential type should be used, retaining the witnessing information. Even in cases where such information can be recovered, we g a i n this only at the cost of having to work in a more complex system, especially in the case where the addition of the judgement P i s t r u e will give a confusion between similar results in the type and proposition modes.
